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I had a sense of déjà vu with Russia’s decision to kick out six alleged British spies in August. After the Salisbury nerve agent attack in March 2018, I sweated for a week in Moscow, waiting to hear if I’d be kicked out in the diplomatic tit-for-tat. Russia’s announcement was timed to embarrass Keir Starmer as he travelled to Washington last week for talks with Joe Biden. It was also a blow to the critically small pool of Russia experts in the British government. In the hostile goldfish bowl of UK-Russia relations, both sides are constantly on the lookout for ‘undeclared’ intelligence officers (i.e. spies) working covertly by masquerading as diplomatically accredited staff in the respective Embassies. We kicked out the Russian Defence Attaché earlier this year. The Russians run a huge ‘guess-the-spy’ game around the clock, with all manner of covert and overt surveillance. I was regularly followed by Russian intelligence, including a fun chase round central Moscow on the day that the post-Salisbury expulsions were announced, with my kids in the back of the car.   Russia’s domestic intelligence service the FSB gleefully revealed details about the six expelled British diplomats and their inexplicable jogging habits around Moscow’s third ring road or curious meetings in towns close to Moscow. In a strange departure from the convention of keeping the details out of the public gaze, the names and photos of the expelled Brits have been flying around social media.  That’s why Russia’s Ambassador Andrei Keilin was hauled into the Foreign Office for a tongue lashing. But there was a big dose of ‘nothing to see here’ in the revelations. Russia hasn’t caught anyone red-handed, not now, or recently, even though they’ve laid on the charm with honey-traps and kompromat. Yes, both sides work hard to gather secrets; the Head of MI6 recently called on Russians to spy for Britain.   The relationship between diplomacy and intelligence is symbiotic; UK and Russian intelligence do have ‘declared’ channels to talk when they really have to.  But the Russians are winning in the real ground game of espionage and diplomacy anyway. Much like in war, having an edge can come down to a bigger supply of the right people with the right skills in the right places. And Russia has a significant advantage over us in the number of staff they employ in the UK compared to our outfit in Moscow. It’s quite simple. Russia only employees Russians at its Embassy. Most staff at the British Embassy in Moscow are also Russian, because of the Foreign Office’s model of employing less expensive local staff. That’s a good model in friendly nations. Less so in Moscow where the FSB has been known to harass locally employed Russian staff.  When I left Moscow in February 2019, almost 90 per cent of the staff across the Russia and British Embassies were Russian.  Add to that, a community of over 150,000 Russians in the UK against a small number of British expats in Russia.   There are seldom more than a few dozen diplomatically accredited Brits at our Embassy Moscow.  After Salisbury, the loss of twenty-three colleagues cleaned out the political wing of the Embassy, leaving a few people like me, with mere months left on their postings, in a two for the price of one deal. Kicking out six political officers in August will have put a bit dent in the Embassy’s ability to function again. Where those officers liked to go jogging in Moscow is really a secondary issue. I took a lunchtime run from the Embassy once surrounded by a crowd of twenty agents, in one of the weirder stunts they pulled on me. The point is, it will take months for replacement staff to get diplomatic visas, if they ever do. So, this is really about degrading the UK’s ability to have a functioning Embassy in Moscow. Russia plays this game better than us.  Fewer Brits in Moscow, means less insight for London policy makers and weaker advice being put to David Lammy. And the UK struggles to generate officers with the right skills to fill the jobs we have at the Embassy in Moscow, as Russia expertise has been hollowed out over the last three decades. The Foreign Office has a poor record in ensuring political staff arrive in Moscow with the Russian language and diplomatic skills they need. I saw no real thought put into a strategic workforce plan to maintain a pipeline of Russia expertise over the longer-term. British universities are slowly cutting back on Russian language degrees.  When I arrived in Moscow in July 2014, the Foreign Office spoke often about the need to ‘rebuild’ after a period of post-Cold War disinvestment. This challenge has yet to be gripped with any vigour or purpose. Russia, on the other hand, has no shortage of English-speaking staff queuing up to work in London. They are generally better qualified, as their Foreign Ministry invests seriously in its Diplomatic Academy and runs a feeder Diplomatic University, which some people call ‘spy school’.   There is a wider problem, too. In recent days, Russian military bloggers have taken great delight in circulating what they claim to be detailed organisation charts of the ‘massive’ Foreign Office’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Directorate (EECAD), following an FSB information hack. But in my experience, most staff in this Whitehall Russia machine lack real experience of working on Russia or with Russians. So, Starmer and Lammy are chest-beating their way around the world, reliant on advice from kids in London and a barely staffed Potemkin Embassy in Moscow. Little wonder they’ve brought no new ideas of their own to the table. Meanwhile, Russia is gaining friends in the global south with a systematic and well organised diplomatic charm offensive, as war rages in Ukraine. By putting insufficient emphasis on our diplomatic capabilities, the UK has rendered itself a global bit part player on Russia behind the US, China, India, France and Germany. We need a better plan for Russia expertise if we really want to outsmart Putin. This article was published by the Spectator on 20 September 2024.

I'm repeating below an article I wrote on X on 13 September, while Keir Starmer was fruitlessly asking Joe Biden for permission to use Storm Shadow missiles in Russia. The argument still holds true in my opinion, and I elaborated a little during my interview yesterday with Alex Chrstoforou and Alexander Mercouris on their Duran Podcast. I've also copied her my recent interview with the very nice Kelley Vlahos, the Senior Advisor and Editorial Director at Responsible Statecraft in the US. In this interview, filmed before Starmer's arrival in Washington, I correctly predict that he won't get the permission he sought to take the world closer to World War III. Thank God I was right (for now)! 13September 2024 The first confirmed use of ATACMS, Storm Shadow or Scalp inside of Russia would provoke a Russian military strike against a western military target. We should step back from this new missile crisis and push for a negotiated ceasefire. When Sir Keir Starmer meets Joe Biden today he will be seeking weapons free to use Storm Shadow missiles inside of Russia. That comes as no surprise. Britain has been militarily the most hawkish adversary of Russia in the Ukraine proxy war. It would, however, be a mistake for Biden to cede to Britain's demands, because it will provoke a military escalation against those NATO states that engage in the use of western weapons in Russia, including the US. Russia has warned consistently of the risk of escalation and, therefore, retaliation. Yes, Russia has been using its weapons against cities in Ukraine since the war started. But from their perspective, the war in Ukraine has remained largely a war between two opposing sides, even if each side has received materiel support from other countries. It doesn't matter if you disagree. That is how the Russians frame their rules of engagement. They would view any use of western weapons, that rely of US systems and #intelligence   in order to function, as a direct act of war by the participating countries. How Russia might respond Following the first confirmed use of a western supplied missile inside of Russian territory, I assess Russia will launch a targeted conventional strike on a US and UK military asset, including possibly in either country or in one of their overseas facilities ( #guam , #diegogarcia etc). I judge Russia would be careful in targeting a military facility to minimise the risk of civilian casualties in #NATO states. As the Russians are highly reciprocal in how they act, I consider the risk of a tactical nuclear escalation as low, at least in the short term. Russia will also fear the risk of escalation leading to a general war which Russia would not be able to win against a much more powerful NATO and which, therefore, would take us a step closer to all out #NuclearWar.   They will also worry about the impact of a disproportionate nuclear escalation on its diplomatic relations in the wider world, in particular with China. While cyber attacks are a constant risk, I judge Russia would want a retaliation that was attributable and which they could use in their communications. Why Putin will have to act It would be suicide politically for Putin to say that he will act, but then allow months to pass with inaction as British missiles rain down on Russian targets. It is a fantasy to think that he will do nothing. A weapons free signal to use Storm Shadow means that these missiles will strike Russian targets at will for the remainder of this war, and no one has a plan for when the war will end. Both the US and the UK are signalling that they are in this for the long haul. And, given the intense internal pressure he will be under - not necessarily from the Russian public - but from the hawkish parts of his inner circle, it would be politically too damaging for Putin not to respond militarily. The political risk to Starmer For Starmer, the risk is that having beaten his chest and somehow appeared more war mongering that Boris Johnson, he will look weak if he backs down now. He is gambling on calling Putin's bluff i.e. that having said he would retaliate Putin would, nevertheless, backdown. However, that is foolish, and driven by the British government's lack of Russia expertise. If Starmer succeeds in getting Biden's approval, then hot on the heels of a disastrous start to his premiership, he may have to explain why Russian missiles are hitting British military targets, potentially in the UK itself. Which may force him to escalate militarily, or back down and look weak and inept domestically. The risk for Biden Biden risks dragging the US into a direct military conflict with the world's biggest nuclear power, the outcome of which he cannot predict, just two months before an election. There won't be the time for the US to emerge victorious over Russia so that Kamala Harris gets some sort of election boost from victory. More likely, American service personnel will die. The Times has already reported that while Biden may permit the use of UK and French cruise missiles, he may nevertheless not agree to the use of ATACMS inside of Russian territory. Pro-war advocates like Jake Sullivan will believe this hedges the risk of a Russian retaliation against America. But that assessment is also false. Russia has said repeatedly that the use of British and French missiles is only possible with the direct assistance and participation of US assets. Conclusion We have entered a crisis as serious as when Khrushchev sent nuclear weapons to Cuba. Right now, lofted up by hubris and an underestimation of the risk to global peace and security, Starmer is going cap in hand to the White House. The risks to him politically, whatever happens, seem overwhelmingly negative. But right now, I'm more worried about the risk to humanity. Starmer should be pressing for a negotiated end to the fighting in Ukraine, not taking us one step closer to nuclear catastrophe.

With Turkey – a key NATO member - having lodged an application to join, BRICS is set to get bigger, and this can only be a good sign for the collective strength of developing nations in a multipolar world.  It’s also a bad sign, longer term, for US political and economic dominance. Two key moments in the acceleration of BRICS were 2014 when the Ukraine crisis started and 2022, when full blown war broke out.  The weaponisation of the global financial system by the west against Russia helped the core focus of BRICS coalesce around the need to create an alternative financial architecture for developing nations. A BRICS bank (now called the New Development Bank was established) to create an alternative to the World Bank. A Contingent Reserve Arrangement was established, providing an alternative to the IMF for countries who need access to a pool of reserves in the face of currency crises. As the Belgium-based Swift interbank communication service has become politicised, so BRICS Pay was created. Throughout, a core aim is to reduce dependence on the US Dollar for global trade and, therefore foreign exchange reserves. Russia and China’s shift to trading oil in Yuan, Saudi Arabia’s abandonment of the Petrodollar Pact, and the UAE and India’s agreement on trading in rupees are good recent examples of countries choosing to de-dollarize.  While the dollar remains the pre-eminent global trading currency, we should expect to see its share of global trade decline slowly over the coming decade.  This will pose longer-term systemic risks to the USA’s ability to service its vast federal debt, as the cost of borrowing inexorably rises.   BRICS is gathering momentum as the potential benefits of membership become clearer in the eyes of developing nations, and Turkey’s bold decision to apply for membership is a sign of that. While I was the economic counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow, I watched in slow motion as dissatisfaction in developing countries grew about western domination of the international financial system. Take the International Monetary Fund. Today, 59.1% of the Fund’s voting shares are accounted for by countries with accounting for 13.7% of the World’s population. 57.7% of the bumper distribution of Special Drawing Rights during the COVID Pandemic went to the world’s wealthiest countries. It's not only that developing countries see that the western dominated financial bodies don’t represent their interests.  They have also became increasingly politicised; for example, under pressure from the US in 2015, the IMF changed its rules on debt servicing to allow Ukraine to avoid default, even though it was at that time refusing ever  to service its debt obligations to Russia.  While IMF conditionality on its programmes is rigid, the rules can be changed quickly if the political imperative from Washington demands it. Take the G7, which was the preeminent grouping of the world’s most affluent nations before BRICS found its feet. Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine, G7 countries coordinated over 20,000 economic sanctions against Russia. There is no plan in place for sanctions relief as and when an inevitable ceasefire in Ukraine starts and a peace process begins.  The G7 froze $300bn in Russian foreign exchange reserves; they have more recently established a funding vehicle in which the proceeds of those Russian assets held in Europe are used to fund weapons supplies to Ukraine. Bodies like the IMF, SWIFT and Euroclear have been decisively subjugated by the political interests of the G7. The G20, was intended to be a more inclusive global grouping of the world’s leading 20 economies when it was set up to focus on international financial stability.  But it has also become increasingly dysfunctional as powerful G7 nations try repeatedly to politicise its agenda. So, BRICS has emerged as a more appealing meeting point for developing countries. Its values of non-interference, equality and mutual benefit mean countries with troubled political relationships can come together to strengthen relations through economic ties.  Hence the China, Russia, India triangle, which over history has been beset by tension and conflict. Iran and Saudia Arabia joined BRICS in 2024, almost unthinkable a few short years ago, but made possible by a gradual thawing in their relations brokered by China in 2023. Pakistan is now looking to join BRICS, despite India’s prominent founding role in the group. This gradual rapprochement through trade should be applauded. When it was first convened in 2009, BRICS was seen as a developing nations’ counterbalance to the rich countries’ club of the G8 (now G7). Today, three of the BRICS founding members rank among the world’s top ten economies. Six are members of the G20 group.  The group accounts for 45% of the global population and 28% of its economic output now. Set free from the need to fit within a west-leaning normative set of rules and values, BRICS collaboration has been unleashed by putting the economics first, and letting the politics follow. It’s therefore no surprise that Turkey – which is also a G20 member - has turned to BRICS. After decades of trying to join the European Union, it’s clear that road is permanently blocked. I don’t see Turkey’s future membership of BRICS and its NATO membership as mutually exclusive.  Indeed, straddling Europe and Asia, I think it’s very much to be encouraged that a prominent NATO member state should enjoy a less antagonistic relationship with the developing world. The very point of BRICS is that countries aren’t required to choose one side against another.  There is a long list of other countries who wish to join BRICS, including Mexico, Nigeria, Bahrain, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam. Before the end of this decade, BRICS will represent a majority of the global population. The USA, the EU and the UK will continue to be powerful players, but their influence on developing countries and their dominance of the global financial system, seems set to wane as BRICS forges a more multipolar world over the longer term.